Seton Hall University

eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship

Seton Hall Law

2021

Evasion of Liability: Recociling for Corporations' Multinational
Character with National & International Law
Angelica M. Mercado

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Mercado, Angelica M., "Evasion of Liability: Recociling for Corporations' Multinational Character with
National & International Law" (2021). Law School Student Scholarship. 1087.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/1087

EVASION OF LIABILITY: RECOCILING CORPORATIONS’
MULTINATIONAL CHARACTER WITH NATIONAL & INTERNATIONAL LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1992, Unocal Corporation and its subsidiary, Union Oil Company of California, acquired
an interest in a French project to produce, transport, and sell natural gas from deposits off the coast
of Myanmar.1 Unocal was allegedly aware that Myanmar’s military was to protect the pipeline and
the survey teams involved in this project, although this fact was disputed.2 Raising a claim under
the Alien Tort Statute, Plaintiffs alleged that the Myanmar Military subjected them to acts of
murder, rape, and torture, acts that successive military governments in Burma and Myanmar had
been known to impose on their citizens.3 The Ninth Circuit recognized that the Alien Tort Claims
Act provided a cause of action as long as “plaintiffs ... allege a violation of ‘specific, universal,
and obligatory’ international norms as part of [their] ATCA claim.”4 The Court then considered
the threshold question of “whether the alleged tort [was] a violation of the law of nations,” finding
that torture, slavery, and murder were jus cogens violations and, thus, violations of the law of
nations, ultimately holding that the Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged violations of the law of nations
under the Alien Tort Claims Act. 5
Following in the promising direction of the Ninth Circuit, a group of Nigerian residents filed
a class action suit in the Second Circuit alleging that Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum Company and
Shell Transport and Trading Company, through their joint subsidiary Shell Petroleum
Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd. (SPDC), armed, financed, and conspired with Nigerian
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Doe I v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 938.
3
Id. at 939-40.
4
Id. at 944.
5
Id. at 945.
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military forces to suppress protests.6 These plaintiffs had been engaged in peaceful protests against
the damaging environmental effects of SPDC’s oil exploration and production practices in
Ogoniland when, according to the petitioners’ complaint, respondents enlisted the Nigerian
military and policy to suppress the demonstrations, which the Nigerian forces accomplished by
attacking villages, by beating, raping, killing, and arresting residents, and by destroying and
looting property.7 The petitioners, who had been granted political asylum in the United States,
sought to hold the corporations civilly liable for their role in the violence, alleging that the
corporations aided and abetted the atrocities, under the Alien Tort Statute, likely anticipating
similar treatment in the Second Circuit as had been handed down in the Ninth Circuit in the Doe I
v. Unocal decision.8 However, both the Second Circuit, and later the Supreme Court, held that
U.S. courts lacked jurisdiction over the petitioners’ claim.9 The Court, going one step beyond the
Second Circuit’s decision, ruled that the Alien Tort Statute did not provide a cause of action for
conduct committed in the territory of a foreign sovereign, reinforcing a presumption of
extraterritoriality even in cases alleging violations under the law of nations.10
Extraterritoriality poses a harrowing obstacle to the domestic adjudication of multinational
corporations’ misconduct, as the legal frameworks for which to reconcile demands for civil and
criminal liability remain unclear and, at times, at odds.11 While corporations, since their inception,
have been governed by domestic law, legal framers could not have foreseen that individual
corporations would develop a structure so complex as to transcend both national borders and
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See generally Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 111 (2013).
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See Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L
L. 45, 54 (2002).
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domestic legal infrastructures.12 The ability of a multinational enterprise to structure itself in such
a way that its directors have the ability to create and select legal personalities, locations, and,
consequentially, what laws will govern it have often made these corporations, in practice, beyond
the reach of domestic legal systems.13 While, for many corporations, the gaping holes in the legal
infrastructure with respect to corporate accountability have enabled harmless cost-saving
schemes,14 some corporations have gone even further, aiding, abetting, and taking advantage of
the commission of human rights violations in the name of profit-seeking.15 The supranational
character of multinational enterprises has created a regulatory problem that enables impunity for
acts of civil wrongdoing and for acts in violation of national and international criminal laws, and
the only viable solution is for states to pursue a national and international approach to addressing
this impunity. This paper will lay forth an argument asserting the need for both the development
of domestic legal frameworks that will overcome the novel jurisdictional issues for multinational
corporations and the formulation of an international treaty to codify the rights and obligations of
multinational corporations and the duties of states to enforce those obligations.
Section II of this paper will provide an in-depth analysis of the regulatory challenge of
enforcing and adjudicating the liability of multinational enterprises. This section will provide a
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Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 283, 28889 (1990) (“American common law, too, is beginning to recognize the inadequacy of entity law in dealing with the
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Levi Strauss).

primer on the legal character of multinational enterprises, a discussion of the regulatory challenges
owed to the peculiar legal character, and a discussion of the jurisdictional principles and challenges
relevant to the adjudication of multinational corporate conduct. Section III will provide a brief
literature review, providing insight into American and international courts treatment of
extraterritorial corporate wrongdoing and scholars’ suggested approaches to the regulatory
problem. Section IV will lay out a proposed framework for addressing the problem, using the
United States as the model for domestic regulatory reform and imagining an effective treatybuilding process for the solution of the corporate impunity.
II. THE CORPORATE REGULATORY PROBLEM
Jurisdictional principles developed long before corporate entities began to utilize disconnected
domestic regulatory regimes to evade liability for their conduct in one jurisdiction by subjecting
itself to the laws of another jurisdiction.16 Lawmakers and courts could not have anticipated a
corporation’s ability to change the laws that govern it, nor could they have foreseen that the veil
of corporate privilege would one day become a mechanism for evading liability for complicity in
tortious and criminal acts. Against the backdrop of antiquated and static legal frameworks, state
courts are generally unable to reconcile their domestic laws with the multinational and evolving
character of the corporate enterprises that they are responsible for regulating.17 Fears of imposing
one country’s will onto another sovereign create a hesitancy for courts to extend their reach beyond
their own borders,18 and in the absence of an adequate international framework specifically
addressing the conduct of multinational corporate actors, these corporations are left effectively
unregulated. But how can states, as individual sovereigns and as members of the international
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BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
MATERIALS 81 (4th Ed. 2019).
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Kiobel, supra note 6, at 109.
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community, advance legal frameworks sufficient to close the loopholes in corporate
accountability?
Using the United States as the model for proposing an improved regulatory legal framework,
this paper contends that a cooperative domestic and international scheme is necessary to begin to
hold multinational corporations civilly and criminally responsible for unlawful conduct.
Domestically, states will need to create or amend statutes applicable to corporate conduct to
empower courts to adjudicate claims of unlawful corporate conduct. Internationally, states will
need to form a consensus on how corporate crimes and torts will be adjudicated, codifying an
international treaty as to the rights and obligations of multinational corporations under
international law. in addition to providing guidelines as to the responsibility of states to enforce
the law. After all, as Justice Scalia stated in his concurrence in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, federal
causes of action must be created by statute, Constitution, or international treaty, and not just general
claims under the common law.19 While legal scholars have demonstrated support for either the
domestic or international remedies to this corporate accountability problem, few, if any, have
proposed the need to pursue both together.20 A successful international legal regime will depend
on the willingness of state governments to engage in a cooperative treaty-drafting process with
other states to hold corporate actors accountable, a process that would theoretically resonate in that
state’s domestic legal regime. Creating both domestic and international laws to hold corporations
accountable diminishes the possibility of corporations continuing to evade liability by simply
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542 U.S. 692, 740-41.
Compare to Larry Cata Backer, Shaping the Global Law for Business Enterprises: Framing Principles and the
Promise of a Comprehensive Treaty on Business and Human Rights, N.C. J. INT’L L. 417, 429 (discussing the futility
of pursuing any international treaty for human rights and the responsibilities business enterprises unless states agree
on the treaty’s fundamental principles and core objectives and demonstrate willingness to compromise where “treaty
writing may produce a challenge to conventional norms and the ideologies of domestic and international law systems
that may require pragmatic compromise in treaty drafting”).
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relocating, as the cooperative regulatory network would drastically minimize the numbers of states
where the corporations would be beyond reach.
A. MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: A PRIMER
The phenomenon of corporate legal personalities has undergone various transformations since
the recognition centuries ago that a corporate entity retains a legal personality separate from that
of its directors and officers.21 Since the inception of the “corporate legal personality,” the very
nature of corporate structures has evolved from a simple corporate entity to increasingly complex
multinational enterprises, an evolution that has outpaced the development of the law with respect
to corporate conduct and liability.22 The increasing complexity of corporate structures and the
inability of the law to keep up with that evolution has created the vast loopholes through which
corporations and their directors and officers evade liability for outright criminal and tortious
conduct, and for complicity in the egregious conduct of other state and/or organizational actors.23
Indeed, while American courts have offered limited recourse from these corporate liability
loopholes through the application of “piercing the veil jurisprudence” in exceptional cases, the
limited body of law has not sufficiently developed in order to address its application to the full
spectrum of corporate liability questions relating to every corporation, from the entity to the
multinational enterprise.24 Effectively, the problem that arises with the structural complexity of
modern multinational corporations is two-fold: first, where the corporation itself is regulated by
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Blumberg, supra note 12, at 292.
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Blumberg, supra note 12, at 291.
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domestic laws, the multinational corporation, with multitiered and cross-border division of labor,
makes the vast structure a regulatory challenge; and, second, the economic and political capital
held by large and economically significant multinational corporations will undoubtedly impact
domestic will to enforce criminal and civil liability against corporations.25
B. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CORPORATE STRUCTURE
In corporate law, the traditional Angle-American rule was that a corporation would adopt the
nationality of the jurisdiction in which it was chartered, while other countries would look to the
jurisdiction where the corporation maintained its principle offices.26 While most countries have
since abandoned more stringent standards for determining a corporation’s “nationality,” many now
look to the corporation’s stock ownership, management, and control to determine such.27 Thus,
when, towards the end of the nineteenth century, the New Jersey state legislature passed a statute
permitting businesses incorporated in New Jersey to own stock in other corporations, the relaxation
of regulations that limited how corporations could structure overseas enterprises presented a
turning point in American business practices.28 This development created the opportunity for an
organizational shift for American multinational enterprises operating abroad. Where those
businesses were previously characterized as foreign corporations operating within the bounds of
those other countries, the ability to own stock in other corporations allowed business owners to
restructure their foreign operations as subsidiary corporations, each organized and maintaining the
nationality of the country where it would operate.29
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Stephens, supra note 11, at 54.
Detlev Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law, 83 HARV. L. REV. 739, 741
(1970).
27
Id. at 742.
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Stephens, supra note 11, at 55-56.
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See Vagts, supra note 30, at 742.
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The significance of this development is underscored by two related principles that guide the
relationship between the corporate entity and the law. First, the territorial principal, a recurring
theme throughout the research of multinational corporate liability, “is predicated on the idea that
economic entities are wholly regulated within a single territory.”30 Second, the “principle of
hierarchy of regulatory authority” posits that “every political community has regulatory power
independent of and superior to the power of the entity regulated or the individuals who have
aggregated resources.”31 Backer suggests that these two principles form a model for enterprise law
whereby “political states form closed regulatory systems subject to an exclusive regulation by a
set of singular political institutions superior in power to and separable from the people and things
these political institutions regulate,” limiting the ways in which people, capital, shareholders, and
the enterprise itself relate to and are affected by the law.32 Corporations are subject to regulation
by the domestic law, a legal framework separate and apart from that of any other state. Where a
corporation chartered within one country is operating within the bounds of a foreign country, the
corporation is effectively subject to the regulation of two states—the state of incorporation and the
state of territoriality.33
Thus, the development in New Jersey of a state law allowing corporations to own shares in
other companies provided an escape from the double-regulatory scheme that multinational
corporations were subject to.34 As the New Jersey policy became the norm, American
multinational corporations began deviating from operating in other countries as “foreign
corporations” and, instead, would opt to operate through subsidiary corporations organized in the
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Larry Cata Backer, The Autonomous Global Corporation: On the Role of Organizational Law Beyond Asset
Partitioning and Legal Perspective, 41 TULSA L. REV. 541, 543 (2006).
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Id.
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Vagts, supra note 30, at 741-42.
34
Stephens, supra note 11, at 55-56.

country in which it intended to operate.35 While, in theory, this novel parent-subsidiary structure
affords a favorable degree of independence to the subsidiary and choice in the applicable
regulatory scheme by way of place of operations, conflicts in governing subsidiaries continue to
arise for the states charged with regulating these corporations.36 Whether and in what situations
the nationalities of the parent or the subsidiary govern, with issues of foreign interference in
domestic corporate regulation often dictating a country’s treatment of a multinational corporation.
As Vagts notes:
“While the [multinational enterprise] chain, thus articulated, does represent a tidy system—
each corporate unit operating as a native within the country of its corporation—tensions
between that legal theory and the economic interdependence of the [multinational
enterprise] keep developing. The home country (in particular the United States) finds it hard
to resist the temptation to extend its authority over the foreign subsidiaries and to treat them
as mere extensions of the parents. On the other hand, host countries find it hard to ignore
the foreign control over their corporations and to treat them on a parity with locally owned
enterprises. . . . They may insist that the subsidiary’s management operate in pursuit of the
best interests of the subsidiary, even where that plan of operation conflicts with the parent’s
plan that the subsidiary be operated in the in the interests of the overall enterprise. Finally,
host countries are often tempted to use their grasp upon the subsidiary to assert regulatory
authority over the operations system as whole.”37
Indeed, these conflicts in law underscore the effect of the absence of an international regulatory
scheme for corporations operating across borders. Multinational enterprises implicate, albeit
indirectly, the sovereignty of both home and host states.38 While the absence of international
regulation demands regulation by individual countries, the challenge will lie in how a home
country enforces their laws against a subsidiary without interfering with the legal integrity of the
foreign country, taking into account the country’s national interests, and demonstrating a regard
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Vagts, supra note 30, at 742.
Id. at 743.
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Id.
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Id. at 786.
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for that country’s sovereignty.39 Even until today, this conflict has created a vacuum in the
enforcement of the law in response to the tortious and criminal conduct of multinational
corporations, where the mandate of any country to pursue legal action is unclear or the relative
economic and political power combined with the extraterritoriality of the multinational enterprise’s
subsidiaries impairs the country’s ability to do so.
C. THE JURISDICTIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATE POLICING
As the previous section highlighted, it is widely accepted that multinational enterprises have
outgrown the domestic legal regimes designed to regulate national corporations.40 The evolution
of the corporate structure and the failure of the governing statutory frameworks to keep up have
enabled multinational enterprises to minimize their liability by taking advantage of the
jurisdictional conflicts and ambiguities related to nationality and legal personality.41 In particular,
multinational corporations three strategies to evade the enforcement of liability for acts that are,
for all intents and purposes, attributable to the parent corporation: outsourcing; “renegade regime
regulation”; and reliance on the corporate veil.42
Outsourcing provides an alternative means to further complicate and alienate a corporation
from the conduct of an independent entity operating within its chain of production.43 Unlike the
formation of subsidiary corporations that can be under the effective control of the parent,
outsourcing entails contracting out the corporation’s operations to unaffiliated entities that do not
share ownership with the enterprise.44 Instead, the corporation outsourcing its operations binds
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Id. at 739, 786-87.
See, e.g., Id.; Backer, supra note 30; Jodie Kirshner, Why Is the U.S. Abdicating the Policing of Multinational
Corporations to Europe?: Extraterritoriality, Sovereignty, and the Alien Tort Statute, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 259,
259 (2012); Stephens, supra note 11.
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Hansen, supra note 14, at 418.
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Id. at 418-19.
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Id. at 420.
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Id.
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itself to the hired entity solely by way of a contractual relationship, giving the outsourcing
corporation significant power over how to define and reduce its exposure to liability.45 Importantly,
because that hired entity remains separately owned and operated, the multinational corporation
cannot be held vicariously liable for the wrongful conduct of employees of that entity committed
in the course of employment.46
Second, corporations employ a strategy coined by Robin Hansen as “renegade regime
regulation,” where a [multinational enterprise] avoids liability in State A by claiming that it is
regulated by State B.”47 Multinational enterprises take advantage of the varied legal infrastructures
from country to country in a number of ways, such as by incorporating subsidiaries in secrecy
havens to hide certain information or the identities shareholders and officers.48
Lastly, corporations capitalize on the distinct legal personalities afforded to corporate
entities and shield themselves behind the corporate veil.49 “First, the corporate veil discourages
courts from assuming jurisdiction over [multinational enterprise] components which are deemed
foreign nationals. . . . Second, the corporate veil makes it difficult to plead a sufficient cause of
action regarding the activities of a [multinational enterprise] component that is not locally
incorporated.”50 Although the corporate veil is not impenetrable, instances of actual piercing of
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Id. at 420-21. Although contractual terms con significantly limit the risk of liability to the outsourcing corporation,
many jurisdictions, including the United States, have statutes in place providing that a contract cannot shield one
contracting party from all liability. Id. However, the ability to reduce exposure to such liability is, nonetheless, a
significant advantage of outsourcing operations to unrelated, third-party entities.
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Id. at 421.
47
Id. at 424.
48
Id. at 425-27. Hansen states, “Use of secrecy havens in [multinational enterprise] corporate structuring further
complicates lawsuits that already face the difficult challenge of determining an appropriate judicial forum for activities
that span multiple jurisdictions.” Id. At 427. Similar to the abuse of tax havens to minimize a corporation’s tax
liabilities to its home government, secrecy havens are characterized by statutory regulations that permit corporations
to withhold certain information that would otherwise affect its liability and culpability in litigation.
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Id. at 432 (“The separate legal personality of [multinational enterprise] corporate components, along with the
doctrine of limited liability for shareholders means that, as a rule, parent companies are not liable for the actions of
their subsidiaries. This separation of liability is referred by some as the “entity law approach to [multinational
enterprise] liability.”).
50
Id.

the veil are limited.51 Indeed, the inconsistent treatment of multinational enterprises based on their
chosen jurisdiction for operations creates a meticulously crafted corporate structure, constructed
around loopholes catering to the corporation’s objectives.
These strategies ultimately rely on the jurisdictional principle of territoriality in order to
insulate corporations from the reach of inconvenient legal systems. Territoriality is one of five
jurisdictional principles long recognized as allowing a state to assert jurisdictional authority over
a legal person.52 “The classical view of domestic jurisdiction under international law is based upon
a robust defense of national sovereignty and the close to unrestricted power of a state to regulate
activities of its nationals or criminal conduct undertaken within, or directed toward, its territory.”53
In one of the most cited iterations of domestic jurisdiction, the Lotus Case established a broad
construction of domestic jurisdiction, reasoning:
“International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law binding
upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by
usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order to
regulate the relations between these co-existing independent communities. . . . Restrictions
upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed. . . . [A]ll that can be
required is that it should not overstep the limits which international law places upon its
jurisdiction; within these limits, its title to exercise jurisdiction rests in its sovereignty.”54
Some scholars have interpreted this to mean that the Lotus Case supports a jurisdictional
construction wherein “states retain residual freedom to act in situations in which international law
does not prescribe a contrary rule.”55
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Id. at 434 (discussing four narrow circumstances under which a jurisdiction may pierce the corporate veil: (1)
statutory intervention; (2) invocation of an applicable legal doctrine; (3) application of a veil-piercing doctrine; and
(4) a direct cause of action against a parent company).
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VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 16, at 82.
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Id. at 81.
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Permanent Court of Int’l Justice, P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (1927).
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VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 16, at 82.

However, under U.S. law, the principle of territoriality has developed a corollary, the
presumption against extraterritoriality.56 The presumption holds that “unless there is the
affirmative intention of Congress clearly expressed to give a statute extraterritorial effect, we must
presume it is primarily concerned with domestic conditions.”57 Unlike the aforementioned
interpretation of the Lotus Case, the presumption against territoriality assumes that the absence of
a contrary rule of jurisdictional construction, jurisdiction cannot be extended extraterritorially,
even if not in contravention of international law.58 The Supreme Court has adopted this “canon of
construction” in avoidance of potential political problems that could arise over contests for
jurisdiction and questions of interference with other States’ sovereignty.59
This narrow interpretation of jurisdictional reach has created gaping legal loopholes through
which multinational corporations can evade liability by using any number of strategies to put itself
beyond the reach of the national courts. Because domestic laws vary from country to country, the
lack of consistency or conflicts in law create ample opportunities for corporations to choose the
State law most favorable to its objectives. Further, the absence of an international regulatory
scheme reinforces the disconnect across legal systems that encourages corporate impunity. What
is required, then, is a cooperative legal regime that reconciles the vast variation in enforcement of
corporate liability, particularly with respect to more egregious corporate conduct, by both
encouraging domestic legal reforms to address the substantive and jurisdictional challenges to
regulation and by establishing an international framework codifying the rights and obligations of
States and corporate entities.
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See Morrison v. National Australian Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010).
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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III. ACADEMIC REVIEW: CASE LAW AND SCHOLARSHIP
The variation in domestic legal treatment of corporate liability, and the absence of positive
international law and established norms, have resulted in the inconsistent legal treatment of
questions pertaining to corporate accountability for unlawful conduct. Focusing on corporate acts
in violation of international criminal law and human rights violations, this section will look at how
the United States and the international community have interpreted the concepts of corporate
liability and extraterritoriality and the directions in which adjudication appears to be headed.
A. UNITED STATES AND THE DOMESTIC LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The United States had long upheld a narrow interpretation of jurisdiction over acts committed
in foreign territory, delineating specific exceptions to the presumption against extraterritoriality.60
The Alien Tort Statute appeared to fall well within that category of exceptions, granting
jurisdiction to district courts over “any civil action by an alien for a tort only committed in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”61 The Alien Tort Statute provided a forum
for adjudication of acts of wrongdoing, but the confines and the outer limits of the statute’s
applicability were not apparently clear from the statutory language itself, except that claims arising
under this law would be civil.62 Although enacted in 1789 as part of the Judiciary Act, the Alien
Tort Statute was rarely visited until 1980, when Paraguayan citizens brought an action against
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Kiobel, supra note 6, at 122 (citing a 1795 opinion authored by Attorney General William Bradford: “So far ... as
the transactions complained of originated or took place in a foreign country, they are not within the cognizance of our
courts; nor can the actors be legally prosecuted or punished for them by the United States. But crimes committed on
the high seas are within the jurisdiction of the ... courts of the United States; and, so far as the offence was committed
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in consequence of the terms in which the [applicable criminal law] is expressed. But there can be no doubt that the
company or individuals who have been injured by these acts of hostility have a remedy by a civil suit in the courts of
the United States; jurisdiction being expressly given to these courts in all cases where an alien sues for a tort only, in
violation of the laws of nations, or a treaty of the United States...”).
61
28 U.S.C. § 1359
62
Id.

another Paraguayan citizen for causing the death of the son and brother, Joelito, by torture.63 The
plaintiffs, Joel and Dolly Filartiga, alleged that Pena-Irala had kidnapped Joelito in retaliation for
his opposition to the Paraguayan government and tortured him to death.64 Plaintiffs further alleged
that the Alien Tort Statute gave U.S. courts jurisdiction over the lawsuit, despite the fact that none
of the parties to the action were American citizens.65 Finding that torture was a violation of
customary international law, the Second Circuit concluded that there was “no distinction between
treatment of aliens and citizens.”66 Indeed, the Court asserted that “[t]he constitutional basis for
the Alien Tort Statute is the law of nations, which has always been part of the federal common
law.”67 The Filartiga decision opened the door for a slew of cases in over the following two
decades where victims of human rights violations that occurred overseas would come to seek civil
redress of those crimes in U.S. courts.68
However, the U.S. courts have increasingly shied away from welcoming extraterritorial suits
into U.S. forums for adjudication and began to limit the kinds of claims that could be brought
under the Alien Tort Statute. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Court held that the Alien Tort Statute
merely granted the federal courts jurisdiction over claims, and the Statute itself did not provide a
cause of action for claimants.69 While still reserving discretion for the courts to extend the federal
courts’ common law jurisdiction to a limited number of claims arising under the law of nations,
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542 U.S. 692, 724-25 (2004).
64

the Court displayed a reluctance to do so, pointing out that “[w]hile the absence of congressional
action addressing private rights of action under an international norm is more equivocal than its
failure to provide such a right when it creates a statute, the possible collateral consequences of
making international rules privately actionable argue for judicial caution.”70 The Court articulated
a two-step framework for permitting a private cause of action under the Alien Tort Statute without
further congressional action: first, a court must determine whether the particular international norm
alleged to have been violated is accepted and defined with specificity, and second, if step one is
satisfied, a court should consider whether allowing the cause of action would be an appropriate
exercise of judicial discretion.71
This trend away from reliance on the Alien Tort Statute has continued, with the Court’s
decisions in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum72 and Jesner v. Arab Bank73 dimming the prospects
of future utility of the Alien Tort Statute for the redress of crimes committed abroad. Kiobel, while
extending the presumption against territoriality to claims arising under the Alien Tort Statute and
precluding claims where all the relevant conduct occurred outside of the United States, left open
the question of whether the Statute could be applied to multinational corporations at all.74 The
Kiobel Court closed its majority opinion by stating: “And even where the claims touch and concern
the territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption
against territorial application. Corporations are often present in many countries, and it would reach
too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices.”75
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Jesner v. Arab Bank, however, resolved the question left unanswered in Kiobel, holding that
the Alien Tort Statute could not apply to foreign corporations.76 Petitioners alleged that
Respondent, Arab Bank, caused or facilitated terrorist acts committed abroad by using its New
York branch to clear dollar-denominated transactions that benefitted terrorists.77 Relying on the
political implications of adjudicating claims involving foreign corporations by reference to Kiobel
and to the foreign policy concerns arising out of Jesner itself, the Court held that “judicial
deference requires that any imposition of corporate liability on foreign corporations for violations
of international law must be determined in the first instance by the political branches of the
Government.”78 “As demonstrated by this litigation, foreign corporate defendants create unique
problems. And courts are not well suited to make the required policy judgments that are implicated
by corporate liability in cases like this one.”79
In dismantling Alien Tort Statute precedent, the Court effectively rendered moot much of the
scholarly argument in favor of using domestic statutory schemes to hold corporate entities
criminally liable.80 In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor critiques the plurality’s decision for
foreclosing foreign corporate liability under the Alien Tort Statute in its entirety.81 Justice
Sotomayor contends that the plurality misapplied the standard articulated in Sosa, which instructed
the courts to consider “whether there was ‘sufficient consensus’ that, with respect to particular
conduct prohibited under a ‘given norm,’ the type of defendant being sued can be alleged to have
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violated that specific norm.”82 She explains that step one of the Sosa-inquiry could be resolved by
considering “whether the given international-law norm binds only state actors or state and nonstate
actors alike, because there does not appear to be an international-law norm that contemplates a
finer distinction between types of private actors.”83 Indeed, under most international laws,
corporate entities do not appear to be exempt from liability.84
Arguably the last test for the viability of the Alien Tort Statute as a potential tool for victims
will by the Court’s review of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Doe I v. Nestle.85 In a claim against
Nestle for aiding and abetting child slavery in the harvest of cocoa in the Ivory Coast, the Ninth
Circuit held that allegations that Nestle funded child slave labor practices from the United States
were relevant to the claim under the Alien Tort Statute.86 Distinguishing its holding from that of
the Court in Jesner, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that Jesner only derailed the claims against
Nestle insofar as the law applies to conduct committed by foreign corporations.87 However, the
Court’s trend away from liability under the Alien Tort Statute does not bode well for the outcome
of Nestle, and if the Supreme Court’s series of decisions is indicative of anything, it is that domestic
corporate accountability will require legislative remedies within the United States.
B. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’S TRIALS AND LESSONS LEARNED
On the international level, the first successful invocations of corporate criminal liability arose
out of the Nuremberg Trials.88 The Nuremberg trials demonstrated that corporate actors could be
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held liable for their conduct in contravention of the laws and customs of war for conduct which
included the employment of slave labor, the aiding and abetting of criminal conduct by Nazis, and
by reaping financial gain from the appropriated property and assets of victims of the Nazi regime.89
However, these trials also importantly demonstrated the ability of the global community to agree
on the need for redress of egregious criminal conduct. These cases often implicated corporate
actors who had been found guilty of “pillaging” in the context of an armed conflict, defined by the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia as “embrac[ing] all forms of unlawful
appropriation of property in armed conflict for which individual criminal responsibility attaches
under international law.”90 The criminal tribunals following the Second World War demonstrated
a willingness to prosecute the bad acts of corporations and their agents in the context of conflict to
reap gain.91 Indeed, the IG Farben Judgment’s position that “one may not utilize the corporate
structure to achieve an immunity from criminal responsibility for illegal acts which he directs,
counsels, aids, orders, or abets” captured the moral impetus to hold criminal conduct attributable
to the individual, even acting in a corporate capacity.92
One can reasonably infer that the post-World War II plan for prosecuting commercial actors
“involve[d] dispensing with the corporate entity and assessing whether individual business
representatives satisfy requirements for regular modes of liability such as aiding and abetting,
instigating, or direct perpetration.”93 The plan has not been realized universally, as the corporate
entity has remained intact, but some states have demonstrated a willingness to reach parent
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corporations for the conduct of their subsidiaries.94 A number of cases arising out of European
countries have adopted an enterprise theory of liability, in which parent corporations are deemed
to effectively control the conduct of all subsidiary entities within the enterprise.95 The approach
taken by the English courts, in particular, have circumvented the challenges raised by the U.S.
courts related to extraterritoriality and the challenges that could arise from recognizing an
enterprise as having numerous legal personalities.96 Foreign courts have found jurisdiction over
the mercury poisoning of employees in a mining subsidiary where the parent corporation had an
obligation to prevent it97 and over the assault and detention of protesters by police at the site of a
mining subsidiary for the parent corporation’s failure to prevent the harm,98 for example.
Unlike the United States with the Alien Tort Statute, many European Union member states
have bypassed the requirement of a separate cause of action, some automatically permitting
international law claims to be stated in national courts and others drafting additional laws to create
domestic avenues for redress of corporate liability.99 Interestingly, the European Union itself has
attempted to enact rules that would enable European courts to access corporate liability for conduct
committed abroad and “has called upon the European Commission to develop a mandatory
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‘European multilateral framework governing companies’ operations worldwide.’”100 The
European Parliament also unsuccessfully proposed the “[standardization] corporate liability and
the law of corporate groups,| which would have had the effect of broadly regulating the conduct
of foreign subsidiaries.101 The European Court of Justice has consistently ruled that corporations
bear legal responsibilities to comply with and prevent the violation of human rights laws.102 Thus,
while the United States has demonstrated a clear reluctance to pursue both corporate civil and
criminal liability, European countries, among others, have begun to move in the opposite
direction.103
Despite the growing impetus to hold multinational corporations accountable from a number of
European countries and the European Union, the broader international community has been unable
to make progress on formulating a cohesive regulatory framework, largely due to countries’
unwillingness to compromise on the parameters and conditions of a collaborative project.104 In
2014, the United Nations Human Rights Council established an intergovernmental working group
specifically intended to address the absence of an international regulatory framework pertaining
to the regulation of multinational corporations and other corporate enterprises.105 The working
group sought to resolve concerns arising out of the 2011 United Nations Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights, wherein predominantly civil society actors and scholars criticized the
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Guiding Principles for requiring little affirmative action on the part of corporate actors to
comply.106 While the working group arose out of Guiding Principles, the projects are essentially
two sides of the same coin, one providing a theoretical basis for a comprehensive regulatory
framework and the other creating a practicable enforcement mechanism by which to enforce the
theories and principles.107
The Guiding Principles are premised on three foundational priorities: “States’ existing
obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights and fundamental freedoms; the role of
business enterprises as specialized organis of society performing specialized functions, required
to comply with all applicable laws and to respect human rights; [and] the needs for rights and
obligations to be matched to appropriate and effective remedies when breached.”108 Indeed, the
Resolution itself iterated “the importance of building the capacity of all actors to better manage
challenges in the area of business and human rights”, emphasized “that transnational corporations
and other business enterprises have a responsibility to respect human rights,” and recognized “that
proper regulation, including through national legislation, of transnational corporations and other
business enterprises and their responsible operation can contribute to the promotion, protection
and fulfillment of and respect for human rights and assist in channeling the benefits of business
towards contributing to the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”109 Meanwhile,
the working group proceeded with the mandate of deliberating on “the content, scope, nature and
form of the future international instrument” that would codify the principles into positive law.110
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The latter project proved to be challenging, where member states could not agree on the specifics
of the concepts that would comprise the content of the regulatory instrument: a renewed
commitment by States to regulation; shared principles; concepts and legal nature of transnational
corporations; extent of human rights to be covered; the enforcement obligations of States; scope
of the interests to be protected; enhanced duties of corporations; the legal liability of corporations;
and international remediation mechanisms.111
While the international efforts to create a universal regulatory framework have, to date, not
borne much fruit, and States have demonstrated an inability to reach a consensus on the
fundamental tenets, the United Nations Guiding Principles and the intergovernmental working
group have shown, at minimum, that States are willing to engage in discourse recognizing the
absence of and the need for regulation of multinational corporate entities. While suffering from
their own flaws, the two projects symbolize the first steps in the development of a regulatory
scheme.112 As such, the United Nations’ endeavors serve to provide hope that there does exist a
possibility for an international collaborative effort among states to create and enforce a framework
and legal scheme for the regulation of corporate conduct across national borders.
IV. CONCLUSION: A RECOMMENDATION
CORPORATE IMPUNITY

FOR

THE

REDRESS

OF

Up until now, domestic regulatory schemes have governed the conduct of multinational
corporations. However, as globalization increasingly defines the nature of economic relationships
internationally, and as the profit-seeking motives of multinational enterprises guide the decisionmaking of parent corporations and their subsidiaries, the need for a regulatory scheme that
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transcends borders continues to become more pressing. While some states have demonstrated that
they have the legal infrastructure to prosecute and hold corporations civilly accountable, there has
been no uniformity in enforcement around the world. In fact, as a number of Alien Tort Statute
cases in the United States have demonstrated, corporations have largely been able to evade
accountability for their conduct based on jurisdictional obstacles that are, by definition,
characteristic of the structure of a multinational corporation.113 The demise of the Alien Tort
Statute as a mechanism for redress of harms committed outside of the United States, and the
particular rejection of liability for corporate actors, demonstrates that domestic schemes will not
be enough to regulate multinational corporations, even where some States do seem to be headed
in a more favorable direction. An international consensus is necessary.
However, while many United Nations member states have displayed a willingness to cooperate
in the development of shared principles of corporate responsibility and in the drafting of a legal
instrument, those watching the progress of the Guiding Principles and the working group should
remain, at best, cautiously optimistic. In the drafting of the Statute of the International Criminal
Court, the States rejected the idea of including corporate criminal responsibility within the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, leaving the prosecution of corporate entities for
international criminal conduct to the discretion of and subject to the laws of the states
themselves.114 In response, some countries, like Canada and the United Kingdom, have authorized
their courts to exercise jurisdiction over war crimes and, specifically, pillaging through interpretive
acts, while other countries, like Australia, have explicitly included corporate criminal liability
within their legal code.115 However, while the efforts of these States to codify a principle of
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corporate liability, absent a supranational obligation, the uniformity of corporate accountability
remains a distant goal.
The fact that individual States have undertaken efforts to incorporate new statutes or amend
old statutes to create causes of action for corporate wrongdoing, unfortunately, has no influence
on other states’ obligations to conform their domestical legal frameworks to those of the
international community.116 As Kiobel demonstrated, the United States Court of Appeals was
reluctant to extend liability to a corporation under the Alien Tort Statute for “violations of the law
of nations” because “the concept of corporate liability for violations of customary international
law has not achieved universal recognition or acceptance as a norm in the relations of States with
each other.”117 Indeed, how will customary international law develop if individual states are
unwilling to follow suit in upholding newer legal norms of international law precisely because
those norms have not risen to the level of qualifying as “customary”? Thus, the guarantee of
corporate liability for extraterritorial conduct is doubly dependent on the initiatives of individual
states to, first, recognize and codify corporate liability for criminal conduct and, second, extend
their reach to the strategically-structured corporate entities, so long as that exercise of jurisdiction
does not violate international law. Moreover, the enforcement of the states’ responsibility to
contribute to the creation of cohesive domestic laws, to the development of a strong international
framework, and to the cooperation of the international community as a whole to address the
concerns over corporate impunity require that regulation occur on the international level as well.
International regulation will eventually need to take the form of an enforceable agreement,
such as a treaty prescribing affirmative duties to enforce corporate liability. However, as the
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Guiding Principles and working group have demonstrated, the formulation of international
consensus is a complex and difficult feat. In the short-term, international agreements to continue
to cooperate in the formulation of principles for corporate liability and in the enforcement of such
acts would demonstrate a good-faith intent to address and resolve the deeply troubling concerns
over corporate impunity, particular for human rights violations and other egregious criminal acts.
In sum, the complexity of multinational corporate structures has empowered multinational
corporations to capitalize in legal vacuums, wherein corporations evade liability for their tortious
and criminal conduct. Redress of this problem requires an international collaborate efforts. States
will need to reform domestic statutory schemes, avoiding statutory failures like that of the Alien
Tort Statute where the where the nuanced legal characters of multinational enterprises can evade
accountability. States must also be willing to subject itself to a broader international regulatory
framework, creating rights and obligations for both the states and the corporations. A supranational
scheme is the only legal mechanism that can both ensure states’ enforcement of corporate liability
and corporations’ compliance with international laws. However, that international instrument will
require consent and collaboration, two factors that have proven challenging in past efforts to
regulate at the international level.

